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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GARY CHRISTIAN DAVIS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20050952-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony; possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) within a drug-free zone, a second degree 
felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia within a drug-free 
zone, a class A misdemeanor (R. 109, 111). This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant, a restricted person, handled an assault 
rifle by sighting the weapon and trying to insert the clip, did 
the evidence suffice to convict him of "intentionally or 
1 
knowingly . . . possess[ing], us[ing], or [having] under his 
custody or control" a firearm? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that xreasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
2. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury that a 
bicycle path is a "public park" within the meaning of the statute 
defining drug-free zones? 
Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury 
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Snvder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah 1997). 
3. Did the parole officer's testimony that someone told him 
defendant was at a motel "with possibly a gun and dope" 
constitute inadmissible hearsay where it was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted and where defendant himself admitted 
both that he used drugs and handled a gun in the motel room? 
In evaluating the admissibility of hearsay evidence, legal 
questions are reviewed for correctness, while questions of fact 
are reviewed for clear error. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 110, 
122 P.3d 639 (citing Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 
1993) (legal questions) and State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, fl3, 4 
P.3d 778 (questions of fact)). The trial court's ruling on 
2 
admissibility is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, 510, 94 P.3d 193). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (2) (a) (West 2004), provides: 
(2) A Category 1 restricted person . . . who 
intentionally or knowingly purchases, 
transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his 
custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (a) (West 2004), listing places 
designated as drug-free zones, is attached to this brief as 
addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, possession of a 
controlled substance within a drug-free zone, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia within a drug-free zone (R. 1-2). A jury 
convicted him as charged (R. 98-100) . Defendant filed a motion 
to arrest the judgment, which the trial court denied (R. 103-04, 
112). The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive one-to-
fifteen year prison terms on the felony charges and one 
concurrent year in jail on the misdemeanor. The court imposed no 
fines (R. 109-11, 117-19). Defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R. 120-21). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Having received information that defendant, a parolee, was 
at a St. George motel "with possibly a gun and dope," agents of 
Adult Probation and Parole [APP] went to the motel to investigate 
(R. 134: 53, 57, 140). Agent Seegmiller knocked on the door of 
room 106, and defendant opened the door (Id. at 73, 106). 
Agent Seegmiller, who was certified as a drug recognition 
expert, testified that defendant appeared to be under the 
influence of a central nervous system stimulant, exhibiting such 
symptoms as anxiety, difficulty understanding and following 
simple conversation and directions, and grinding his teeth (Id. 
at 73-74). Two other people were also in the room with defendant 
(Id. at 74, 144; R. 135: 257). A third was detained shortly 
thereafter in the motel parking lot (R. 134: 95; R. 135: 202). 
Agent Seegmiller entered the motel room and conducted a 
visual sweep, immediately noticing two vials in plain view on a 
night stand (R. 134: 75-76). A further search revealed multiple 
items of paraphernalia, including plastic bags, scales, syringes, 
and a butane torch (Id. at 77-78, 80). Officers also found an 
SKS assault rifle in an unzipped case on the floor by the night 
stand (Id^ . at 85-86, 108-09).l 
Among the officers present was defendant's parole officer, 
Agent Bower, who questioned defendant about his activities. 
1
 The gun was not loaded, and the officers found no 
ammunition in the room (R. 134: 110). 
4 
Defendant admitted to having used drugs in the motel room and 
later signed a positive drug test statement in lieu of a drug 
test (Id, at 100-01, 117).2 Agent Bower testified that defendant 
appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine, noting in 
particular his high anxiety and inability to sit still (Id.). 
As to the assault rifle, defendant told the agent, "Yeah, my 
fucking fingerprints will be on the gun, but it's not mine and I 
didn't bring it here" (Id. at 141; accord id. at 99, 115, 118, 
141) ) . Jeremy Arrington, a meth user detained in the parking 
lot, also testified about the rifle, stating that he brought it 
to the motel room and showed it to defendant and the other man 
who was there (R. 135: 219-20). He stated, "It was like me 
bringing some new toy. Everybody wants to look at it. It's like 
something you notice - I mean look at it, it's noticeable" (R. 
135: 246). According to Arrington, defendant handled the gun, 
moved the slide back, and tried to fix a problem with fitting the 
clip into the rifle (Id. at 220-21, 247-48) . The woman who was 
also in the room testified that when Arrington produced the 
rifle, defendant handled it by "facing the mirror and just like 
holding it up like he was — as if he was going to fire at 
somebody" (Id^ . at 2 60) . 
2
 This statement was the dispositive evidence in 
defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance. 
On appeal, he contests only the enhancement of this charge. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 28-30. 
5 
Defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), and possession of paraphernalia (R. 1-2). The 
latter two charges were enhanced for being committed in a drug-
free zone. See. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (a) (West 2004). A 
jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 98-100). On appeal, 
defendant challenges only the possession of a dangerous weapon 
conviction and the drug-free zone enhancements. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on a per curiam decision, State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 
(Utah 1985), defendant argues that the evidence in his case was 
insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person because he did nothing 
more than "innocently handle" an assault rifle. Id. at 233. 
However, the applicable statute, amended after Davis but before 
this case arose, prohibits a restricted person from knowingly or 
intentionally exercising dominion, even briefly, over a firearm. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (a). Where defendant held an 
assault weapon in a sighting position and tried to insert the 
clip into it, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude he 
"intentionally or knowingly purchase[d], transfer[ed], 
possesse[d], use[d], or [had] under his custody or control" a 
firearm. No more is necessary to sustain the conviction. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by 
determining as a matter of law that a public bicycle park is a 
6 
"public park" for purposes of the drug-free zone enhancement 
statute. He further maintains that the statute contains no other 
grounds for enhancing his crimes. Given the statute's purpose of 
protecting children from drug transactions in areas they are 
likely to frequent, the fair import of the term "public park" 
encompasses public bicycle paths. To exclude a bicycle path 
because it happens to be long and narrow wholly ignores both its 
public recreational function and its attractiveness to children. 
Moreover, the drug-free zone enhancements can also be sustained 
because the motel where defendant was arrested was located within 
1000 feet of a "public parking lot" and a "shopping mall." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4) (a) (vii), (viii), (ix) . 
Finally, defendant argues that the court prejudicially erred 
in permitting the parole officer to testify that he went to the 
motel in response to information that defendant was there "with 
possibly a gun and dope" (R. 134: 139-40). Even had the trial 
court erred in admitting the parole officer's testimony, however, 
its admission would not have been prejudicial because the 
testimony added nothing to what the jury properly heard. First, 
as the trial court correctly determined, the testimony was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to 
explain why the officer went to the motel. Second, defendant 
himself admitted that he used methamphetamine and handled the gun 
in the motel room, and the two other individuals also in the 
motel room corroborated that defendant handled the assault rifle. 
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Thus, even if the trial court had erred in admitting the parole 
officer's testimony, any error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT, 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO ESTABLISH 
THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY POSSESSED, 
USED, OR HAD UNDER HIS CUSTODY OR 
CONTROL AN ASSAULT RIFLE 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain his conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. He asserts that a convicted felon, on notice 
that he cannot possess a gun, must do more than "innocently 
handle" an assault rifle in order to incur criminal culpability. 
See Br. oC Pet. at 18-26. In his view, because the evidence 
showed no more than "innocent handling," it was insufficient to 
sustain his conviction.3 
3
 Defendant also argues that the trial court prejudicially 
erred by allowing Agent Seegmiller to testify to his 
understanding that handling a gun, without more, sufficed to 
establish a statutory violation for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person. See Br. of Aplt. at 26-28. This 
argument fails at the outset because defendant has not included 
the court's actual jury instructions in the record on appeal. 
Where the record is incomplete, this Court should simply presume 
the correctness of the proceedings below. See, e.q., State v. 
Rawlinqs, 829 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah App. 1992); Utah R. App. P. 
11(e)(2). In any event, though, in discussing jury instructions, 
the trial court appeared inclined to instruct the jury that the 
statute " 'requires a willing and knowing possession [of a 
dangerous weapon] with the intent to control its use and 
management'" (R. 135: 295). Such an instruction would have 
rendered any error in the agent's testimony harmless. 
8 
Defendant relies on a per curiam opinion, State v. Davis, 
711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985), and cases cited therein, to support his 
argument. In Davis, undercover agents visited defendant in his 
home. Defendant, a parolee, brought out a pistol to show them. 
After the agents handled the gun, defendant took it back, and the 
agents departed. Id. at 233. The agents later returned with a 
search warrant and found the pistol on defendant's fireplace 
mantel. Id. Defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. On 
appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by refusing to add a 
paragraph to the possession instruction, stating that an unloaded 
gun was not a dangerous weapon. Id. at 234. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected his claim and approved the instruction as given, 
which provided that "^possession, custody or control' of a 
firearm was more than the innocent handling of the weapon, but 
required a willing and knowing possession with the intent to 
control its use or management." Id. at 233. The court reasoned 
that this instruction did not confuse either the statutory 
elements or mens rea for the crime and permitted defendant to 
argue his theory of the case, which was that, because the gun was 
unloaded and not capable of inflicting harm, he only "innocently 
handled" it. Id. 
The trial court in the instant case instructed the jury in 
compliance with Davis, and the jury found defendant guilty of 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person. On appeal, 
9 
defendant nonetheless argues that, based on the authority of 
Davis, he did nothing more than "innocently handle" the gun. 
Therefore, he concludes, the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to prove the offense. Defendant's reliance on 
Davis is misplaced. 
Defendant committed his crimes in 2005. In 1985, when Davis 
was issued, the statute provided simply that: 
(2)(a) Any person who is on parole for a 
felony . . . may not have in his possession 
or under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon. . . . 
(b) Any person who violates this section 
is guilty of a third degree felony, and if 
the dangerous weapon is a firearm, . . . he 
is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(1985). In 2003, the statute was 
amended to provide that: 
(2) A Category 1 restricted person who 
intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, 
offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, 
possess, use, or have under his custody or 
control, or who intentionally or knowingly 
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a)(West 2004). 
The 1985 statute articulates no mental state, simply 
delineating "possession" and "custody or control" as acts 
forbidden to convicted felons. These general terms left 
substantial room for judicial interpretation, thus giving rise to 
the Davis per curiam opinion, which carved out, but did not 
10 
clearly define, an exception for "innocent handling" of a 
dangerous weapon. See Davis 711 P.2d at 233. 
In contrast, the 2003 statute explicitly articulates knowing 
or intentional mental states in conjunction with a list of 
prohibited conduct. Through its plain language, the statute 
makes clear that convicted felons cannot knowingly or 
intentionally associate themselves with guns under any of a wide 
range of circumstances, including both an array of attempt 
offenses and another array addressing the offenses themselves. 
For example, under the amended statute, a restricted person 
cannot handle a gun if he knows it is a gun. If, however, he 
handles a gun thinking it is a broom or a floor lamp, he would 
not be culpable. The amended statute thus clarifies and narrows 
the ambiguous 1985 statute by focusing not on "innocent handling" 
but on specific categories of conduct, which must be either 
knowing or intentional. 
The 2003 statute breaks down into two operative phrases, the 
first addressing acts prepatory to the actual offense and the 
second addressing the offense itself. The second phrase, 
relevant here, proscribes a category 1 restricted person from 
"intentionally or knowingly purchas[ing], transfer[ing], 
possess[ing], us[ing], or ha[ving] under his custody and control" 
any dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (West 2004). 
"Possess" typically means "to have as property" or to "own." 
http://bartleby.com/61/4 8/PO4 64800.html; accord 
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http://dictionary.cambridge.org (enter "possess;" then click 
"look it up"). "Use" typically means "to put (something) into 
your service for a purpose." http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
define.asp?key=use*l+0&dict=A; accord http://www.bartleby.com/ 
61/57/U0155700.html. "Control" denotes the "authority or ability 
to manage or direct." http://www.bartleby.eom/61/0/C0610000. 
html; accord http://encarta.msn.com (enter "control" in "Search 
Encarta" and click "Go"). "Control" also encompasses "the 
ability or power to decide or strongly influence the particular 
way in which something will happen . . . or the condition of 
having such ability or power." http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
define.asp?key=control*l+0&dict=A. Finally, "custody" means 
either "the act or right of guarding, especially such a right 
granted by a court," or the "care, supervision, and control 
exerted by one in charge." http://www.bartleby.com/61/40/ 
C0824000.html. Given these definitions, a reasonable 
construction of the whole phrase is that a restricted person 
cannot with knowledge or intent buy a gun, be given or serve as a 
middle man for the transfer of a gun, own a gun, put a gun into 
use, be able to manage what will happen with a gun, or have any 
control over a gun. A restricted person simply cannot knowingly 
and intentionally exercise dominion, however briefly, over a 
firearm. 
In this case, the undisputed facts establish that defendant, 
who knew he was on parole and could not possess a firearm or have 
12 
a firearm under his control, nonetheless intentionally handled an 
assault rifle, knowing it was a weapon (R. 134: 55-56). Where 
defendant tried to fix a problem with inserting the clip and 
sighted with the weapon, he plainly exercised temporary control 
over the weapon. That is, he exercised his ability to manage how 
the gun was manipulated during the time he had it in his 
possession. He also used the gun by exercising control over it 
for the particular purposes of sighting it and trying to insert 
the clip into it.4 Because defendant's conduct fell within the 
plain meaning of the statutory terms, the evidence sufficed to 
demonstrate that, as a restricted person, he knowlingly and 
intentionally "possesse[d], use[d], or ha[d] under his custody or 
control" a firearm.5 
4
 That he did not ultimately shoot the gun does not remove 
his conduct from the ambit of "using" the weapon. If such were 
the case, only the final act of pulling the trigger on a loaded 
weapon would constitute "use." To interpret the word so 
restrictively would diminish its ordinary, commonly-accepted 
meaning. See State v. Paul, 860 P.2d at 994 n.3 (absent express 
legislative modification, appellate court must apply word in its 
"usual and most common sense"). Had the legislature intended to 
impose a more restrictive meaning and limit culpability to a 
smaller class of cases, it surely would have employed the words 
necessary to unequivocally do so. See State v. Masciantonio, 850 
P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993) (presuming legislature uses each 
statutory term advisedly). To the contrary, however, when the 
legislature amended the statute, it plainly enlarged its ambit. 
5
 Moreover, this plain language interpretation clearly 
comports with the statute's mandate that persons who have been 
convicted of violent felonies - category 1 restricted persons -
should not associate themselves with dangerous weapons. Such a 
proscription plainly protects public safety, benefitting society 
as a whole, even when it may occasionally restrict a violent 
felon from pursuing a desired pastime. See State v. Black, 2001 
WI 31, 1 19, 624 N.W. 2d 363 (articulating rationale for finding 
13 
Davis, on which defendant relies, does not compel a contrary 
result. Where the jury was instructed in compliance with Davis, 
its verdict simply attested to its collective conclusion that his 
intentional handling of an assault rifle — holding it in a 
sighting position and trying to insert the clip — was not an 
"innocent handling" of a dangerous weapon but instead amounted to 
"a willing and knowing possession with the intent to control its 
use or management." Davis, 711 P.2d at 233; see also State v, 
Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)(where defendant 
knowingly kept weapon in his trailer and exercised control over 
it because he was sole resident, evidence sufficed for conviction 
of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person); cf. 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1986) (where no 
evidence adduced that defendant knew gun was in reisidence shared 
with two others or that he exercised any control over it, 
conviction for possession of dangerous weapon by restricted 
person could not be sustained). 
actual physical control, even for a brief period cf time, 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT A BICYCLE 
PATH WAS A "PUBLIC PARK" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE STATUTE DEFINING 
DRUG-FREE ZONES; MOREOVER, THE 
CRIMES ALSO OCCURRED WITHIN 1000 
FEET OF A SHOPPING MALL AND PUBLIC 
PARKING LOT, TWO OTHER DRUG-FREE 
ZONES 
Defendant argues that the area surrounding the motel where 
he was arrested is not a statutory drug-free zone. Primarily, he 
argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
instructed the jury that a bicycle path is a public park within 
the meaning of the statute defining drug-free zones (Br. of Aplt. 
at 30-32). Defendant also contends that the area encompassing 
several fast-food restaurants, motels, and other small businesses 
does not constitute a "shopping mall" and that several parking 
lots adjacent to these businesses are not "public parking lots" 
within the meaning of the drug-free zone statute (Id. at 28). 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that a bicycle path is a public park within 
the meaning of the drug-free zone enhancement statute. Id. at 
30-32. This argument fails both procedurally and on its merits. 
At the outset, defendant's argument should not even be considered 
because defendant has failed to provide this Court with a 
complete record upon which to evaluate the claim. Absent the 
approved jury instructions that were actually given, this Court 
has no way of knowing how the jury was ultimately instructed. 
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The law is well-settled that defendant bears the burden of 
ensuring bhat the record contains all the materials necessary to 
support the appeal. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 138 6, 1388 (Utah 
1988); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). Absent a 
complete record, this Court cannot address defendant's claim and 
presumes the correctness of the trial court's disposition. Call 
v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Assuming arguendo that the jury was instructed as defendant 
indicates, however, his argument that a bicycle path is not a 
public park nonetheless fails as a matter of law. By statute, a 
drug-free zone exists within 1000 feet of "a public park, 
amusement park, arcade, or recreation center." Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8 (4)(a)(v), (ix) (West 2004). While the statute does not 
define the phrase "public park," it should "be construed 
according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice 
and to effect the object of the law . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-106 (West 2004) . 
This court has recognized that the object of the drug-free 
zone statute is "to protect the public health, safety, and 
welfare of children of Utah from the presumed extreme potential 
danger created when drug transactions occur on or near a school 
ground [or other public places frequented by children]." State 
v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting State v. 
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 503 (Utah App. 1989)). In short, the 
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statute seeks "to protect children from the influence of drug-
related activity." State v. Stromberq, 783, P.2d 54, 60 (Utah 
App. 1989). This goal is effectuated by increasing the penalties 
for unlawful drug-related activities within 1000 feet of locales 
frequented by young persons. 
Defendant argues that a bicycle path is not a public park 
for two reasons. First, Utah's statute was modeled on a similar 
federal statute, which includes a specific definition of 
"playground[s]" but makes no mention of public parks. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 31; 21 U.S.C. § 860(e). While true, this difference in 
wording does not alter Utah's policy choice to specifically 
include public parks in its law. By so doing, the legislature 
recognized as a matter of public policy that drug activity in or 
within 1,000 feet of a public park is likely to affect children 
and should, therefore, carry enhanced penalties. 
Second, defendant argues that the trial court's jury 
instruction was erroneous because a bicycle path is not a "park" 
as a matter of law. Recognizing that an undefined term should be 
construed according to its common meaning, he contends that the 
phrase "public park" as it is commonly used "does not include 
bike paths," which are more like "thoroughfares" (Br. of Aplt. at 
32). He relies on the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
defining "park" as, among other things, "a piece of ground in or 
near a city or town kept for ornament and recreation." Id. 
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Defendant also concludes, somewhat curiously, that the bike path 
was not "intended for the recreation of children." Id. 
In construing the phrase, "public park," defendant argues 
only that a bike path cannot be considered a "park" (Br. of Aplt. 
30-32).6 While case law is sparse, one appellate court has 
construed the term in this context. Also referencing dictionary 
definitions, the appellate court of Washington concluded that a 
trail was park. See In re Petition of City of Long Beach, 82 
P.3d 259, 263 (Wash. App. 2004) (citing Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language, 1642, 2423 
(1969)(defining "park" as "a tract of land maintained by a city 
or town as a place of beauty and recreation" and "trail" as "a 
track made by passage" or a "beaten path")). The court reasoned 
that the Discovery Trail was a park because "the City is 
constructing and maintaining [it] for aesthetic and recreational 
purposes." Id. Of direct relevance here, the Washington court 
noted: "That the trail's shape is long, narrow, and meandering, 
rather than rectangular or square, does not detract from its 
function and definition as a public park." Id. 
While the Washington court's decision primarily resolved an 
eminent domain issue, the court's rationale focused on the 
intended use of the land as the framework for assessing whether a 
"trail" should be considered a "park." Similarly, in this case, 
6
 That is, defendant does not take issue with the term 
public." 
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responding to defense counsel's bare allegation that the trial 
was "just an easement on private property," the trial court 
stated, "Counsel, we're not talking real estate law here. We're 
talking about use of the land" (R. 134: 65). 
Trial testimony in this case indicated that the St. George 
bicycle trail "was run and maintained and operated by the parks 
and recreation department" (R. 134: 121; R. 135: 313). The very 
nature of the Parks and Recreation Department indicates that the 
trail was used for recreational purposes. Likewise, the trail's 
aesthetic value can be inferred from its location in scenic 
southern Utah. Moreover, this Court may take judicial notice 
that children ride bicycles and frequent bicycle paths. Indeed, 
the path in question here was not located in a mountainous area 
or on the outskirts of a city that might be difficult for 
children to access. It was within St. George, near one of the 
city's main thoroughfares, in close proximity to motels, 
restaurants, parking lots, and other businesses (R. 134: 69-73, 
120-22; see also Br. of Aplt. at 28). Correctly evaluating the 
status of the bicycle trail in this case, the trial court 
concluded: "I think this biking trail is—as I see it, is a public 
park" (R. 135: 314). 
The area surrounding the motel where defendant was arrested 
constituted a drug-free zone based on two other sections of the 
statute as well. First, a drug-free zone exists within 1000 feet 
of a "public parking lot or structure." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
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(4)(a)(viii), (ix). Defendant argues that the several parking 
lots within 1,000 feet of the motel are not "public parking lots" 
because their use is restricted to guests and customers of the 
adjacent businesses (Br. of Aplt. at 28). Defendant's narrow 
definition of the word "public," however, runs contrary to common 
understanding, case law, and the intent of the statute. 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines "public" as 
"accessible to or shared by all members of the community." 
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/public. At least one state, 
California, has recognized that for purposes of certain criminal 
statutes, private property "readily accessible" to the public is 
classified as a "public place." People v. Tapia, 129 Cal. App. 
4th 1153, 1162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see generally People v. 
Vega, 18 Cal. App. 3d 954, 958 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (market 
parking lot accessible to members of the public having business 
with the market is a public place for purposes of statute 
prohibiting loaded firearms in vehicles while in public places); 
People v. Green, 15 Cal. App. 3d 766, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
(hospital parking lot accessible to members of the public having 
business with the hospital is a public place.) The reasoning of 
these cases provides a compelling rationale for considering the 
parking lots adjacent to various fast-food restaurants as "public 
parking lots" for the purposes of Utah's drug-free zone statute. 
That is, these parking lots, while reserved for customers of the 
businesses, are accessible to all members of the community, 
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including its most vulnerable young members. Children frequent 
such parking lots precisely because of their proximity to places 
of interest to them; i.e., restaurants, shops, etc. Therefore, 
public parking lots should reasonably be construed to mean 
parking lots readily accessible to the public. 
A drug-free zone also exists within 1000 feet of "a shopping 
mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto." Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4) (a) (vii), (ix) . Here, defendant argues 
the absence of a shopping mall by separately listing each type of 
business and indicating that the statute does not include these 
businesses when drawing the boundaries of a drug-free zone (Br. 
of Aplt. at 28). 
This group of businesses may, however, constitute a shopping 
mall. Merriam Webster Online Dictionary defines "mall" as "a 
usually large suburban building or group of buildings containing 
various shops with associated passageways." http://www.m-
w.com/dicstionary/mall (then select "mall [2, noun]"). The 
phrase "shopping mall" thus does not necessarily refer to one 
enclosed structure. In this case, the fast food restaurants and 
several other businesses were connected by approximately four 
entrances to the area, a configuration that appears to conform to 
the dictionary definition of a shopping mall (R. 134: 70-72). 
Furthermore, children are likely to frequent such an area because 
of the easy accessibility of inexpensive food and the prime 
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location to meet and spend time with friends. Classifying such 
an area as a "shopping mall" for purposes of the drug-free zone 
statute fits well within the purpose of the law. 
Defendant's argument fails, then, because the trial court 
properly instructed the jury that a public bicycle path falls 
within the ambit of the term "public park" as it is used in the 
drug-free zone enhancement statute. Moreover, defendant's 
unlawful conduct also occurred within 1000 feet of both a 
shopping mall and a public parking lot. For all of these 
reasons, his claim fails. 
POINT THREE 
THE PAROLE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY THAT 
HE WAS INFORMED DEFENDANT WAS AT A 
MOTEL "WITH POSSIBLY A GUN AND 
DOPE" WAS NOT HEARSAY BECAUSE IT 
WAS NOT OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF 
THE MATTER ASSERTED; IN ANY EVENT, 
ITS ADMISSION CAUSED NO PREJUDICE 
WHERE DEFENDANT HIMSELF ADMITTED 
BOTH THAT HE USED DRUGS IN THE 
MOTEL ROOM AND THAT HE HANDLED THE 
GUN 
Defendant argues that the trial court prejudicially erred 
when it allowed the parole officer to testify that Agent 
Seegmiller told him that defendant "was supposedly in a motel 
room in the St. George area with possibly a gun and dope" (R. 
134: 140); see Br. of Aplt. at 32. He argues that this 
testimony, while purportedly used to explain the officer's 
actions, m fact "served no purpose other than that of 
prejudicing the defendant" (Br. of Aplt. at 37). Moreover, he 
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asserts, it was not cumulative of any other properly admitted 
evidence. Id. 
Defendant's objection to the testimony of the parole officer 
arose in the following context. Prior to trial, after reviewing 
the preliminary hearing tape, defense counsel noted to the court 
that the officers went to the motel because "they had a report 
that defendant was staying down there" and also because they had 
"other hearsay that . . . the defendant or somebody else was down 
there trying to trade a firearm for controlled substance" (R. 
134: 41). Because defense counsel knew of no witness prepared to 
testify about the trade, he motioned the court in limine to 
"prohibit anything other than the fact that [the officers] were 
advised that the defendant was at that hotel" (Id. at 42). The 
prosecutor agreed that he would not pursue the trade issue, and 
the court granted the motion, stating, "[W]e will not talk about 
that motel, except as the residence [sic] of [defendant]" (Id.). 
At trial, in explaining how he came into contact with 
defendant, Agent Seegmiller testified: 
I had received information that [defendant] 
was in a motel room on South Bluff, the 
Ridgeway — in fact, the motel room was 
identified and the motel was identified on 
South Bluff; and that he had in his 
possession a firearm and — 
Id. at 57. At this juncture, the prosecutor cut the witness 
off and redirected the line of questioning.7 Later in the trial, 
7
 Defendant states in his appellate brief that he did not 
object to Seegmiller's testimony because the State "took 
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defendant's parole officer testified about his contact with 
defendant. The following exchange occurred: 
Witness; We was notified by agents in 






Object to whatever they 
notified him about. I mean 
it's obvious that there was 
some reason to go check him 
out. The rest is hearsay, 
your Honor. 
All right. It is, counsel, 
but it is only for the purpose 
of explaining [the parole 
officer]'s actions on that 
date. 
Members of the jury, even 
though that is hearsay, you 
are not to accept that 
evidence for the proof of the 
matter asserted — to prove the 
truth of anything asserted, 
but just to give you an 
explanation as to why [the 
parole officer] did the things 
that he did. 
Go ahead, [prosecutor]. 
What did you hear? 
Well, I was notified by Agent 
Seegmiller that [defendant] 
was supposedly in a motel room 
in the St. George area with 
possibly a gun and dope. 
immediate action to bring Seegmiller's testimony into conformity 
with the court's order" (Br. of Aplt. at 33). Because no 
objection was registered to it at trial, Seegmiller's testimony 
cannot now be the object of defendant's hearsay argument on 
appeal. Rather, the appeal arises from the subsequent testimony 
of the parole officer, to which defendant did object. See R. 
134: 139. 
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Id. at 139-40. The prosecutor then went on to other 
matters. 
Rule 801 defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). The parole officer's statement in this 
case was not hearsay because, as the trial court correctly noted, 
it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted — that 
is, it was not offered to prove that defendant was in a motel 
room with a weapon and drugs — but rather to explain why 
defendant's parole officer went to the motel in the first place. 
See State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah App. 1996). If the 
parole officer's testimony had been offered to actually prove 
that defendant was in possession of either a gun or controlled 
substances, then his statement would have been inadmissible.8 
Here, the trial court correctly admonished the jury that the 
parole officer's statement only explained the reason he went to 
the motel and did not "prove the truth of anything asserted" (R. 
134: 139). Indeed, the truth or falsity of the parole officer's 
statement was immaterial. 
8
 That is, the statement would then qualify as inadmissible 
hearsay because it was offered to prove that defendant possessed 
a gun or drugs and the parole officer was not the person who 
originally uttered the statement. Moreover, the originator of 
the statement was not identified and was, therefore, unavailable 
for cross-examination. See, e.g., Utah R. Evid. 801(c). 
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In any event, the statement was cumulative and, therefore, 
harmless. Defendant admitted to Agent Seegmiller both that he 
used methamphetamine in the motel room and that he handled the 
assault rifle (Id^ at 91, 99, 100, 141, 115, 117, 118, 131). 
Defendant's concessions to Agent Seegmiller put that testimony 
appropriately before the jury. Moreover, the two other 
individuals found in the motel room with defendant also 
corroborated that defendant handled the weapon. See R. 134: 220-
21, 248, 251, 260, 271). The parole officer's more general 
subsequent statement thus added nothing to what the jury already 
had properly before it. For this reason, defendant's argument 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count each of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, a second degree felony; possession of a 
controlled substance within a drug-free zone, a second degree 
felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia within a drug-free 
zone, a class A misdemeanor. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (4)(a) (West 2004), governing penalties for certain prohibited 
acts, provides in relevant part: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution 
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure 
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-
10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 76-8-311.3. 
